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THE NATURE, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENSES OF CONFLICTS IN AFRICA IN THE POST INDEPENDENCE ERA USING THE RWANDA GENOCIDE OF 1994 AS A CASE-STUDY

AUGUSTINE OMOSA OBAZEE
Department of Philosophy
Faculty of Arts, University of Benin
Benin City, Edo State, Nigeria
Email: austinemission@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

The history of the world has always been punctuated by cycles of violence, regardless of time, region or race. Genocide, which is one of the worst forms of violence, has always led to horrific socio-economic and environmental impacts. The last decade of the 20th century was the most turbulent Rwanda has ever experienced in its history. The country was ravaged by civil war, genocide, mass migrations, economic crisis, diseases, return of refugees and environmental destruction. Rwandan families were affected by and are still dealing with impacts such as death, disease, disability, poverty and loss of dignity. The Rwandan Genocide of 1994, in which approximately 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were systematically killed within 100 days, stands as one of the most horrific episodes of mass violence in the 20th century. Rooted in deep-seated ethnic tensions, colonial legacies, and political manipulation, the genocide devastated Rwanda's social fabric. Its aftermath left millions displaced and traumatized, prompting global introspection over the failure of international intervention. This paper however focuses on the Rwandan genocide of 1994 as a case-study of post-independence conflicts in Africa. This paper will begin with the meaning and types of conflict in Africa, alongside with the pre-Rwandan genocide, an overview of the Rwandan genocide before later considering the nature, causes and consequences of the conflict. The 1994 Rwanda genocide is reckoned as one of the worst forms of ethnic cleansing which challenged the conscience of man and governments across the globe. The conflict may also be viewed as an economic crisis, civil war, or struggle for state power.

Keywords: genocide, conflict, war, ethnicity.

Introduction

The Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues (1986) notes that the history of mankind is a long succession of wars and conflicts. This goes to explain that conflict is as old as mankind, manifesting in virtually every facet of human interactions. The history of Africa as a continent is replete with conflict, which goes to say that the African continent at different times has experienced different kinds of violent conflicts (Kaplan, 2000, pp. 34–60). It can easily be postulated that the dominant current that runs in the whole of Africa: from North to South, East to West and Central is conflict and wars. These range from boundary and territorial conflicts, to civil wars, ethnic conflicts, succession crisis, as well as political and ideological conflicts (Horowitz, 1985). Since the 1960s, series of civil wars had taken place in Africa. Examples include: Sudan (1985–2005), Chad (1965–85), Angola since 1974, Liberia

(1980–2003), Nigeria (1967–1970), Somalia (1990–1993), Burundi, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (1991–2001) (Aremu, 2010).

The 1990s saw no diminution in the number of conflicts in Africa, and most forecasts predicted further increase. While Africa has had its share of inter-state wars, the majority of its conflicts were internal, and these internal conflicts appear to be increasing, as elsewhere. A tragic factor in this is that the civilian populations bear the brunt of the casualties in such conflicts, estimated at some 80–90 per cent of total casualties across the world. These conflicts cause not only casualties and refugees but contribute vastly to the spread of disease, malnutrition and starvation, social and economic decline and moral deterioration (Renner, 1996).

Meaning and Typology of Conflict

Conflict in this paper is defined as a violent armed confrontation and struggle between different groups within a state or among states. Conflict usually occurs primarily as a result of a clash of interests in the relationship between parties, groups or states, either because they are pursuing opposing or incompatible goals. According to Lewis Coser, conflict is a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are to injure or eliminate their rivals (Coser, 1956). As David Weeks puts it, "conflict is an inevitable outcome of human diversity and a world without conflict is not desirable because it would mean a world without diversity. Africa is a diverse continent, diverse in ethnic, religious and socio-cultural terms" (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000). Two types of conflicts have been identified. These include:

Internal conflict or intra-states conflict — This is one in which the governmental authorities of a state are opposed by groups within that state seeking to overthrow those authorities with force of arms (Herbst, 2014). Internal conflict may also be seen as one in which armed violence occurs primarily within the borders of a single state (David, 1997).

International conflict or inter-state conflicts — This category on the other hand takes place between two or more nations and involve forces of more than one state. It is apt to observe that Africa has experienced both types of conflict over the years.

Causes of Conflicts in Africa

Conflicts in Africa may be said to have been caused by a multiplicity of factors such as: arbitrary borders created by the colonial powers, heterogeneous ethnic composition of African states etc.

Ethnic Marginalization

Ethnicity by itself is not violent; however the concept has been manipulated in societies polarized into two imbalanced divides with one faction feeling marginalized (Annan, 2014). Nevertheless, to a larger extent, for a heterogeneous community like Africa, ethnicity has become a dividing factor that continues to drive violent conflicts and civil strife within and among communities and states, destabilizing the peace in the sub-region. Ethnicity has bred the feelings of suspicion, hatred and distrust among members of the various ethnic groups in Africa and has no doubt retarded political integration in Africa. Research conducted across the sub-region identifies ethnicity and ethnic fragmentation as one of the root causes of violent conflicts in Africa (Sambanis, 2001). Similar stories may also be told of Liberia, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Sudan, Congo and a host of other African states.

Colonial Legacy

It has been observed that the colonization of Africa by European powers in the 19th century created political units that divided ethnic groups in some cases and combined rival groups in others. As currently composed, boundaries of most African states were arbitrarily drawn without regard to ethnic and cultural affinities. In some cases, European boundaries forced starkly different, rival cultures to cohabit within the confines of a single state. The impacts of these borders were felt to varying degrees from one country to the other throughout Africa (Huntington, 1993).

The Rwandan state is a prime example of how the colonial shadow shaped independent African States' fate. It is safe to say that without colonial policies to rigidify the existing political identities and introduce a mono-ethnic power structure, postcolonial Rwandan history could have taken a completely different turn (Huntington, 1993). Belgium was very much responsible for the climate of hate and the social acceptability of racist prejudice and ingrained it deeply into the Rwandan society. The Belgians are undeniably involved, considering the fact that they deeply interfered in Rwandan society and everyday life. Subsequently, when they disappeared after independence in 1963, they left behind the widespread racism they had created. Even though pre-colonial Rwanda was a feudal society, which was made up of different groups, Hutu and Tutsi co-existed peacefully which was not the case when the Belgians departed in 1963. Their racial prejudice fed on "myths and images of inferiority and superiority" during the colonial period (Uvin, 1998).

Bad Governance and Corruption

Following independence, several regimes across the sub-region have mismanaged state resources and weakened governance institutions which has resulted in economic stalemate, political apprehensions and breakdown of social peace and stability. Today, these twin factors constitute a major cause of violent conflicts and civil strife in Africa. Several scholarly works on conflicts in the sub-region have identified bad governance and corruption as the underpinning factors fuelling and renewing violence in Africa. Conflicts in Nigeria, Rwanda, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and other African countries notably hinge upon bad governance and corruption. For instance, in the Sierra Leonean war, it was identified that bad governance, corruption and poverty were the root causes of the conflict (Goodhand, 2003).

Ethnocentrism

This is basically a belief that one's own culture (religion, ways of doing things, beliefs, economic and political system) is more superior. It is evident in most African societies and has been the cause of several conflicts in Africa including the Nigerian Civil War. In the case of the Rwandan genocide the distinction between the Hutus and Tutsis is a clear indication of ethnocentrism and ethnic rivalry and is an indispensable explanation into the outbreak of the genocide. It is also important to note that both the Germans and the Belgian colonial authorities used and furthered the pre-existing "ethnic" division to consolidate their hold on power but even leading up to the 1994 violence seem to differ little from the colonial past (Falola & Usman, 2009). The idea of ethnic differences mattered in a little way and avoidance of inter-ethnic marriage was common amongst other ethnic groups (Cottle, 2000). The Hutus prohibited marriage and business relations with the Tutsis; no Hutu was to show any mercy to Tutsi people while the Rwandan military was to consist of the Hutus. Even the educational

sector favoured the Hutus, ensuring that the Hutu ideology be taught to every young Hutu etc. This is not to say that tensions did not exist amongst these people, but it wasn't the major cause of the genocide. Three Rwandan scholars argue in competition over control of scarce land. Their study linking land scarcity and distribution to the genocide, that ethnicity was a most "cover" for the competition over control of scarce land (Musahara & Huggins, 2005, p. 16).

Unequal Distribution of Resources

Poor management and unequal distribution of state resources are among the factors that led to the outbreak of the Rwandan genocide. Prior to the outbreak of conflicts in Rwanda, the new political oligarchies monopolized the power and the resources of the young independent State on the basis of identity, be it "ethnic" (Hutu), regional (South, North) or other. As result, political powers favoured the climate of corruption, hegemony and exclusion. Jobs, schools were distributed unequally in favour of groups in power. This situation complicated social relations, resulting in frustration of the underprivileged and in crystallization of the sense of belonging to an identity, from crises and conflicts. Burundi did not do better and inequalities of opportunity arose around regionalism. The cleavage "North-South" in Uganda was based also on unequal distribution of resources to which the country has failed to eliminate (Peters, 2004, pp. 269–314).

Economic Meltdown

In mid-1980s, Rwanda was severely hit by deteriorating coffee prices on world market, and the diminishing of the amount of its external earnings. The exports value which was $60 per capita per annum in the period 1976–1979 fell at $13 in 1991. With decreasing external earnings, the capacity of the regime to redistribute state resources among its clients and to attract new ones suffered, and dissatisfied elites started to express opposition to the political system. While in the 1950s there was a crisis of the unequal land resource appropriation, the 1980s were characterized by a crisis of egalitarian land allocation of the earlier years of the Republic era. But whereas there were unutilized land resource reserves in the 1950s, almost all drained arable lands were cultivated. Agricultural production reached a peak in early 1980s, while population continued to grow. The land scarcity resulted into overexploitation of smaller landholdings, and accelerated deterioration of crop production environment (Homer-Dixon, 2010).

Pre-Rwandan Genocide

The Rwanda population of more than 7 million people is divided into three ethnic groups: the Hutu (who made up roughly 85% of the population), the Tutsi (14%) and the Twa (1%). Prior to the colonial era, Tutsis generally occupied the higher strata in the social system and the Hutus the lower. Historically, Hutus have been mainly agricultural labourers while the Tutsis were landowners. Tutsis were favoured in terms of education and employment over the Hutus who were neglected. Also, the Belgian administration introduced identity cards to distinguish one's ethnic origin. These acts unsurprisingly led to tensions between the Hutus and Tutsis. However, social mobility was possible: a Hutu who acquired a large number of cattle or other wealth could be assimilated into the Tutsi group and impoverished Tutsi would be regarded as Hutu. A clan system also functioned, with the Tutsi clan known as the Nyinginya being the "most powerful." Throughout the 1800s, the Nyingiya expanded their influence by conquest and by offering protection in return for tribute (Saad, 2014). The former

colonial power, Germany, lost possession of Rwanda during the First World War and the territory was then placed under Belgian administration. Hence, the Rwandan Civil conflict can be traced to the Belgian rule of 1916–1962 which was characterized by poor or dissimilar divisions between the two principal ethnicities by the colonial administration. The effect of colonial rule was felt during the next few decades that followed the Independence. Hutu leaders were determined to retain power rather than repairing the psychological damage done by the colonizers (Scorgie, 2004).

In the late 1950s during the great wave of decolonization, tensions increased in Rwanda. The Hutu political movement, which stood to gain from majority rule, was gaining momentum while segments of the Tutsi establishment resisted democratization and the loss of their acquired privileges. In November 1959, a violent incident sparked a Hutu uprising in which hundreds of Tutsi were killed and thousands displaced and forced to flee to neighbouring countries. This marked the start of the so called 'Hutu Peasant Revolution' or 'Social revolution' lasting from 1959 to 1961 which signified the end of Tutsi domination and the sharpening of ethnic tensions. By 1962, when Rwanda gained independence, 120,000 people, primarily Tutsis, had taken refuge in neighbouring states to escape the violence which had accompanied the gradual coming into power of the Hutu community (Khan, 2000). Tutsi refugees in Tanzania and Zaire seeking to regain their former positions in Rwanda began organizing and staging attacks on Hutu targets and the Hutu government. Ten such attacks occurred between 1962 and 1967, each leading to retaliatory killings of about 10,754 people which includes Tutsi civilians as well as rebels thereby creating new waves of refugees. By the end of the 1980s some 480,000 Rwandans had become refugees, primarily in Burundi, Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania. They continued to call for the fulfilment of their international legal right to return to Rwanda. However, Juvenal Habyarimana, then president of Rwanda, took the position that population pressures were already too great, and economic opportunities too few to accommodate large numbers of Tutsi refugees (Magnarella, 2002, pp. 25–34).

In 1988, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was founded in Kampala, Uganda as a political and military movement with the stated aims of securing repatriation of Rwandans in exile and reforming of the Rwandan government, including political power sharing. The RPF was composed mainly of Tutsi exiles in Uganda, many of whom had served in President Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army, which had overthrown the previous Ugandan government in 1986 (Thom, 1999). On September 30, 1990, the RPF launched a major attack on Rwanda from Uganda with a force of 4,000 fighters while the Rwandan government got supplies of troops. There were 300 French troops, 535 troops from Belgium and 1,000 troops from Congo Kinshasa. Both parties agreed to cease fire on October 26, 1990 and all military hostilities ended on November 1, 1990. This resulted in the killings of about 1,000 individuals during this conflict. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) deployed a Military Observer Team (MOT), consisting of military observers from Burundi, Uganda and Zaire from April 1, 1991 to September 30, 1991 (Berman & Sams, 2000). But military hostilities continued in April 1991 and Zaire mediated the signing of a ceasefire agreement between the parties involved in Gbadolite, Zaire on October 26, 1991. Then on July 22, Tanzania mediated a ceasefire agreement between the government and the RPF in Arusha, Tanzania (Foley, 2004). However, in ensuring that both parties keep to their agreement, the OAU deployed the Neutrality Military Observer Group (NMOG I) to monitor the ceasefire agreement beginning on August 1, 1992. NMOG I consisted of 45 military observers from Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and

Zimbabwe (10 military observers from each of the countries, plus five additional Non-Commissioned Officers from Nigeria). Other attacks began in Northern Rwanda by the RPF on February 8, 1993 and this attack brought condemnation on the RPF from the governments of Belgium, France and the United States on February 9, 1993 (Reyntjens, 2004).

Furthermore, the Rwandan government accused Uganda of supporting the RPF and the countries referred the matter to the United Nations (UN) Security Council on February 22, 1993 (Reyntjens, 2004). This resulted in the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda on June 22, 1993 to monitor the Rwanda-Uganda border. The UNOMUR consisted of 81 military observers from Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Hungary, Netherlands, Senegal, Slovak Republic and Zimbabwe. NMOG I was replaced by NMOG II on August 1, 1993 and the NMOG II consisted of 132 observers from Congo-Brazzaville, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia and 62 Non-Commissioned Officers from Tunisia. Another ceasefire agreement was signed by Rwandan government and the RPF representatives in Arusha by the Tanzania government on August 3, 1993. About 15,000 individuals were killed and about 350,000 individuals were displaced (Des Forges, 1999).

On the 5th of October 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) with a mandate encompassing peacekeeping, monitoring of the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures to monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate leading up to elections; and to assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations and general support for the peace process (Sutterlin, 2003). At its maximum strength, the UNAMIR consisted of about 5,200 peacekeeping troops and 320 military observers from 40 countries, 120 civilian police personnel. The NMOG II was disbanded on October 31, 1993. The RPF and the Rwandan army together then form a smaller, United National Army (Malkki, 1996). Although Habyarimana would remain president during the transition period, specified ministerial positions were allocated to members of the RPF and other political parties. Elections were scheduled to be held 22 months after the transitional government took office (Bratton, 1998). Many members of the Habyarimana government, including the Hutu-extremist Committee for the Defence of the Republic (CDR), were unhappy with the Arusha Accords, which gave the RPF significant power: RPF members would control key ministries and would hold a great deal of influence in the army. Habyarimana continued his two-track policy: He appeared to cooperate with international efforts to implement the Arusha Accords while simultaneously working to maintain his hold on power through the militias (Percival & Homer-Dixon, 1996). Habyarimana and the CDR used every possible opportunity to increase social cleavages to create animosity toward the RPF. Two events were exploited to their fullest to incite anti-RPF and anti-Tutsi sentiments. First, the October 1993 massacres in Burundi were used to create and fuel fears of the RPF; the killings were to a large degree carried out by Burundi's Tutsi-dominated army. Second, on February 21, 1994, Felicien Gatabazi, the leader of Rwanda's Social Democratic Party, was killed by assassins. In retaliation, a senior CDR official in Gatabazi's hometown was murdered. The CDR quickly organized violence in Kigali where CDR members killed several hundred people, with the majority of those targeted Tutsi (Des Forges, 1999). The media, particularly radio, continued to spread unfounded rumours, which exacerbated ethnic problems.

Nature of the Rwandan Genocide

On April 6, 1994, following the plane crash that led to the death of Presidents Juvenal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira of Rwanda and Burundi respectively, a systematic massacre of the Tutsi ethnic minorities had been ignited, and was to last for several weeks. The conflict culminated in the death of over one million Rwandans — thereby attaining the unofficial classification as Rwanda's darkest period. The events of the conflict came as a rude shock to the international community and was immediately tagged as acts of genocide. Besides, aside the direct consequences of the conflict on the loss of lives, an estimated 150,000 to 250,000 women were also raped while properties amounting to several million dollars were also destroyed.

Less than half an hour after the plane crash that killed the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, members of the presidential guard started killing Tutsi civilians in a section of Kigali near the airport; road blocks manned by Hutu militiamen often assisted by gendarmerie (paramilitary police) or military personnel were set up to identify Tutsis. On April 7, Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) aired a broadcast attributing the plane crash to the RPF and a contingent of UN soldiers, as well as incitements to eliminate the "Tutsi cockroaches" (Des Forges, 1999). Later that day, the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana alongside 10 Belgian UNAMIR peacekeepers assigned to protect her were brutally murdered by Rwandan government soldiers in an attack at her home.

After the massacre of its troops, Belgium withdrew the rest of its force. On April 21, after other countries were asked to withdraw troops, the UNAMIR force reduced from an initial 2,165 to 270 (Des Forges, 1999). The European Union (EU) imposed economic sanctions against Rwanda in 1994. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) established a mission consisting of about 80 international personnel and 650 local personnel to provide humanitarian assistance beginning in 1994 (Sutterlin, 2003).

Now, if the absence of a resolute commitment to reconciliation by some of the Rwandan parties was one problem, the tragedy was compounded by the faltering response of the international community. The capacity of the United Nations to reduce human suffering in Rwanda was severely constrained by the unwillingness of its member-states to respond to crises in the country. On June 22, the Security Council authorized the deployment of French-led forces consisting of 3,050 troops from France (2,550 military personnel), Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Mauritania, Egypt, Niger and Congo-Brazzaville to mount a humanitarian mission. The mission, called Operation Turquoise, saved hundreds of civilians in South West Rwanda, but is also said to have allowed soldiers, officials and militiamen involved in the genocide to flee Rwanda through the areas under their control. In other areas, killings continued until July 4, 1994 when the RPF took military control of the entire territory of Rwanda (Des Forges, 1999). The RPF and moderate Hutu political parties formed a new government on July 18, 1994, but the country was still in chaos. The RPF installed a transitional government headed by Pasteur Bizimungu as President on July 19, 1994. The US government deployed 2,350 military personnel to Rwanda to provide humanitarian assistance (Operation Support Hope) between July 24 and September 30, 1994 (Govern, 2004). The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) established a mission to provide repatriation assistance to Rwandan refugees in July 1994 (Malkki, 1996).

The Rwandan government began the long-awaited genocide trials at the end of 1996. A three-member UN commission of inquiry (Guinea, Mali and Togo) investigated violations of human rights and reports of genocide in Rwanda starting from August to December, 1994 (Moghalu, 2005). The delay was due to the fact that the country had lost most of its judicial personnel, not to mention the destruction to courts, jails and other infrastructure. The French-multinational force withdrew from Rwanda in August and the UNOMUR was disbanded in September, 1994. At the international level, on November 8, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) which consisted of nine judges based in Arusha, Tanzania to investigate the violations of international law (Akhavan, 1996). In August 1995, the UN Security Council suspended military sanctions (arms embargo) against the Rwandan government but military sanctions remained in effect against the opposition groups. Investigations began in May 1995. The first suspects were brought to the court in May 1996 and the first case began in January 1997.

By 2000, there were over 100,000 genocide suspects awaiting trial. In 2001, the government began implementing a participatory justice system, known as Gacaca, in order to address the enormous backlog of cases (Moghalu, 2005). Communities elected judges to hear the trials of genocide suspects accused of all crimes except planning of genocide or rape. The defendants in Gacaca courts have been released provisionally awaiting trial. The releases have caused a lot of unhappiness among survivors who see it as a form of amnesty. Rwanda continues to use the national court system to try those involved in planning genocide or rape under normal penal law. These courts do not offer provisional release for genocide defendants. The Gacaca courts give lower sentences if the person is repentant and seeks reconciliation with the community. These courts are intended to help the community participate in the process of justice and reconciliation for the country (Moghalu, 2005). The UN Tribunal has jurisdiction over all violations of international human rights that happened in Rwanda between January and December 1994. It has the capacity to prosecute high-level members of the government and armed forces that may have fled the country and would otherwise have gone unpunished. The court has since convicted the Prime Minister during the genocide Jean Kambanda, to life imprisonment. It was also the first international court to convict a suspect for rape as a crime against humanity and crime of genocide (Akhavan, 1996). The court also tried three media owners accused of using their respective media to incite ethnic hatred and genocide. By April 2007, it had handed down twenty-seven judgments involving thirty-three accused (Akhavan, 1996).

The Rwandan genocide may be understood as different forms of conflict. These include the Rwandan genocide as ethnic cleansing and as a civil war. Ethnic cleansing may be referred to as the systematic forced removal of ethnic or religious groups from a given territory by a more powerful ethnic group, with the intent of making it ethnically homogeneous (Kiwuwa, 2012). The forces applied may be various forms of forced migration (deportation, population transfer), intimidation, as well as mass murder and rape.

The Consequences of the Conflict

Today, adult males make up only 20% of the Rwandan population. This is because several males had been killed during the conflict. The genocide has therefore eventuated in a situation where women and children make up the vast majority of the Rwandan population. Based on current estimates, over 50% of the Rwandan population is under 20 years old and the median

age of the population is 22.7 years old (World Health Organization, 2010). The genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994 did not only destroy the economy and government but also families. The slaughter of over one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu mainly reflected more on the male population. Most of the men were slaughtered during the genocide and in the presence of their children and wives. The men were tortured psychologically before death and most of the Tutsi women were raped and then slaughtered (Sharlach, 1999, Pp. 387–399). During the genocide, tens of thousands of women and girls were raped, including one who was only two years old. The assailants raped as part of their attempt to exterminate Tutsi, some of them incited by propaganda about Tutsi women disseminated in the period just before the genocide. The extent of the brutality was such that victims willingly paid to die through gunshot. In many places, killers refused to permit the burial of victims and insisted that their bodies be left to rot where they had fallen. The devastating consequences for those who were left behind are unmistakable, because many of whom survived unspeakable atrocities — are still the victims of systematic human rights violations day in and day out. Not only do the genocide survivors face trauma and psychological stress caused by the events of the genocide itself, but they face psychological stress of anticipating the recurrence of the mass slaughter. The stress and fear are highly elevated due to the fact that known killers and genocide victims are living side by side as neighbours. After the Tutsis took over government, most of the Hutu government officials and militiamen fled to neighbouring countries like Tanzania, Zaire and Republic of Congo to avoid prosecution.

Despite the so-called end of the genocide in 1994, conflict continues today. The genocide spilled over to the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), then known as Zaire, where Hutu rebels' government officials, soldiers and militia who had participated in the genocide fled for fear of Tutsi revenge. Here they settled in refugee camps and their ideology of Tutsi extermination was reborn. They continued killing Tutsi refugees in this country, drawing funds from foreign aid dollars, most of them Hutu who had been told that the RPF would kill them. Thousands of them died of water-borne diseases. The camps were also used by former Rwandan government soldiers to re-arm and stage invasions into Rwanda. The attacks were one of the factors leading to the war between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo that took place in 1996. Former Rwandan forces continue to operate in the DRC alongside Congolese militia and other armed groups. They continue to target civilian populations and cause deaths, injury and harm (Des Forges, 1999).

More so, the genocide provided motivation for the emergence of the concept of "responsibility to protect." This is as contained in the speech of the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, who in his Millennium Report of year 2000 remarked that: "If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?" (Moghalu, 2005).

Conclusion

The genocide in Rwanda was a tragedy in which over 800,000 were killed. As with other genocides in the world, the one in Rwanda was complex with multidimensional causes and effects. Environmental causes, such as land scarcity, the increasing pressures of population on the land only aggravated the circumstances that led to the genocide. Severe environmental damage was caused during and after the genocide by the mass movement of refugees and the

internal displacement of people (Moodley, Gahima, & Munien, 2010). The underlying factors of the ethnic conflict in Rwanda are basically related to inequality of access to natural resources that is inherent in a skewed control of power. In a country with a predominantly rural economy, and where over-population annihilates economic progress, the state constitutes for groups of elites in power, an instrument of accumulation of wealth and of suppression of rivals of a different ethnic group. Ethnicity in this case is therefore a symptom of unresolved problems of ethnically skewed resource control (Peters, 2004, Pp. 269–314).

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