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# THE METAPHYSICAL ESSENCE OF MAN

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**Abstract**

*Human nature is a concept that denotes the fundamental dispositions and characteristics—including ways of thinking, feeling, and acting—that humans are said to have naturally. The term is often used to denote the essence of humankind, or what it 'means' to be human. This paper is a scientific research paper on the philosophical understanding of the metaphysical essence of man. These are important issues surrendering the human person. Recent philosophical research shows that man's nature influenced his mood of action. The paper shall base the discussion in the classical tradition. In the history of anthropology man's nature depict his action, the force of change and his purpose of existence. Human beings are substantial unities of bodies and soul, existing to give/share themselves and receive from others. Aquinas explained that the soul is connected with acts of existence. The soul has its own act of existence. The soul which is created as a substance needs the body. The connection of the human being with the soul is a necessary relation. Hence, through action, the human being actualised himself. So we can say, man is what he can be through action. To achieve this work, the writer shall apply three structural procedures. The first part deals with the dynamism of the human person. The second part explains the potentiality. The final part substantiates the purposefulness of the human person. Human nature emphasizes the soul as the first act of the principal action and thus makes the body to exist.*

**Keywords: Human person, Aquinas, Dynamism, Potentiality, Action.**

## Introduction

The human nature designate different characteristics of the human person which is expressed in different ways like thinking, feeling, and acting which are naturally expressed in man. Aristotle who was a biologist found that living things are composed of plants, the human beings and non-rational animals. He describes the plants as having a vegetative structure (as a way of functioning). It is expressed in the form of taking in nutrition and reproduction. The non-rational animals constitute the vegetative structure plus a sensitive structure which uses senses to interact with the environment and exhibits desires. The human person adds to this a rational structure which makes them unique (Krapiec, 1983, p. 304).

Human nature implicates the definitive ontological form of the human being for a giving definition of a thing is formed with respect to the matter that gives individuality. Boethius defined the human person an individual substance of rational nature (Aguaus, 2013, p. 45). Substance is a being which is complete in itself so that it exists independently. In this section I shall present some aspects of St. Thomas's view of the human nature. According to the

Aquinas's metaethics, human goodness depends on performing acts that are in accord with our human nature (Krapiec, 1983, p. 304).

But what sort of acts are those? In other words, there are distinguished features characterized by the human person which makes the person's act different in a kind. At this point, we must transcend the minute claim which states that an action is human insofar as it is rational. For this claim is no doubt true, the nature of rationality itself needs explanation. This section seeks to explore more fully just what rationality or reason consists in according to Aquinas. Only then can we understand the nature of human action as rational and determine the end at which such action aims

**1. The Dynamism of the Human Person**

Dynamism refers to general name for a set of philosophical ideas intuited on what concerns the nature of matter. However they may be in other respects, all these views agree in making matter a compositum essentially of simple and indivisible units, substances, or forces. Dynamism also delineates a kind of systems that admit not only matter and extension, but also determinations, tendencies, and forces which are intrinsically to matter. To understand dynamism in a deeper sense, it refers to exclusive systems that do away with the dualism of matter and force by delimiting the former to the latter. Thomas Aquinas at this point argues the human person has a voluntary action. As a result to this, Aquinas suggested that man's actions in some time emanate from ourselves in that they can amount to a moving toward what we can know to be desirable in some way. For Aquinas, voluntary action involves noting an end as good and pursuing it while being able to answer the question based on the question of why you are doing that (Davies, 2014, p. 154).

So far, we've established that human actions are actions that are governed by a reasoned consideration of what is good. The word 'act' which is collated with 'entelechy', has been extended to other things, chiefly from movement; for act is considered chiefly to be movement (Aguaus, 2013, p. 45). Aquinas seems to claim that what is good in question operating as an end which is the object acted upon for the sake of which the agent acts. For the object of the will is the end and the good. There are two worries that appear here, both of which can be settled rather quickly. First, it seems we do not always act for the sake of an end (Aquinas, 1954). Many actions we perform are not products of our own deliberation and voluntary judgment (like nervous twitches, coughing or unconscious tapping of the foot). Although Aquinas shows out that acts of this type are not *properly* human acts because they do not begin from the intentionality of the reason.

We can illustrate at this point on what is considered as the human act. An act is considered as a *human* act insofar as it is a product of the agent's reasoned consideration about what is good. In another note it would seem that Aquinas is erroneous when he noted that the ends (finality) for the aim of which we act are good. Clearly, it is uncertain that many things we go after in life are *not* good. Aquinas does not deny this. He accepts that cognitive misconception and excessive passion can prejudice our moral views and, in turn, disposed us to pick out the wrong things. Aquinas's point, however, is that our actions are done for the sake of what we *believe* (rightly or wrongly) to be good. Whether the ends we pursue are *in fact* good is a separate question—one to which we will return below.

According to Karol Wojtyta, it is mainly through Human acts that we are given access to the very dynamic reality of the person because the act is the fullest manifestation of man- person in the dynamism properly only to him (Aquinas, 2005). Man's acting form the only basis of an authentic reflection on the nature of man. Action (acting connote dynamism) reveals the person and we look at the person through his actions. Man possessed a subjective knowledge of himself and wherefore he comes into a cognitive relation to himself. Also, man has an experience of other men whose position relate to him as a subject of experience. He who experiences is man and he whom the subject of experience experiences is also man. He is both subject and the object. The experience of man, as man- act shows the active moment of man. The human experiences himself in two ways i.e. active and passive. The experience of the human person constitutes an active causal agent of his action as something happening in him. In the experience of a Passive moment he experiences a dynamic subject of what happens in him without his active causal involvement.

According to Aquinas, we experience that human being is the same as object which fill and think. St. Thomas states that law is a rule and measure of human acts (Aquinas, 1954).By this phrase in a strictly formal meaning, namely, human acts qua human acts; that is acts which are posited in a way that is specifically and distinctively human. What distinguishes the human beings nature from other animals is the ability to reason, to deliberate, and to make free choices. Therefore, the human act is one that is posited with knowledge or understanding, deliberation or intention, and freely. We could distinguish such act from what are merely called acts of human beings. These could be attributed to acts over which people have no conscious control such as digesting one's food, scratching one's head absent- minded, carrying out some habit without thinking. Human beings are responsible only for those acts over which they have conscious control. For this reason human acts are sometimes called 'imputable' acts (Aquinas, 2005).

According to Etienne Gilson after Aquinas, the soul is defined as the first act of an organised body capable of performing the functioning of life. The soul *as the first act is the principle of action* it is not directly known to us as we simply infer from it effects and affirms it by a judgment (Aquinas, 2005). Since human beings perform action proper to themselves, they must have their own principle of action; this principle is called a soul. The human person is not a machine, but a composition of a soul and a body. According to Thomas Aquinas, a soul is not only the principle factors of what makes the body to move, but it first of all makes it to exist as such a body. The soul makes the body to exist and brings together. It organizes what we call today the biochemical elements i.e. organic (biological) and inorganic (chemical) elements of the body.

In principle, the soul is the body's first act (that which makes it to be). The human person can exercise other secondary act as a result of the first act (soul).

Man actualizes himself internally through cognition, love and freedom (Aquinas, 1954). From the metaphysical point of view, act is perfection; potentiality on the other hand, is a state of imperfection. Hence activity which is the act of the doer is his actualization or his perfection. So man develops himself (as a doer) through his activity, especially specific human activity, which is intellectual cognition and deliberative desire. Actions are determined by instinct. In the case of animals, action is determined by instincts. The human being has instinct but is very

weak. Rational actions are instinct. Therefore, instinct has action but doesn't rule. The instinct is connected with our rationality. The rationality is our inner action. Rationality of instinct comes from the creator and so the rationality is connected with the end. By intellectual education, we actualise this dynamo.

Aquinas does not appear to support the idea that human actions are intended to further any sort of good. In line with Aristotle, he maintains that everything we do is done for the sake of a higher good—a final goal that we pursue because it is good in and of itself and for which everything else is chosen. It would have been challenging to explain why anyone would desire to achieve anything at all if the end did not exist. This is because of the following. According to Aquinas, there must be a first in order of intention for every action or category of activities (Aquinas, 2005).To put it another way, there needs to be some goal or benefit that is fundamentally desirable and furthers the will's stated purpose.

This perspective shows how a good like that is a reason for want and how it is required for a person to act in order to have what they want. According to MacDonald, the only way to justify a certain course of conduct is to invoke a goal or virtue that has the power to move the will in and of itself (Aquinas, 1961).If you took away the inherently attractive goal, you would also take away the fundamental idea that propels us to take action in the first place. This view also contributes to the argument that we cannot posit a "indefinite series of ends" to account for human behaviour. The existence of an ambiguous set of ends suggests that there is no intrinsically desirable good toward which the action of the individual is directed. We wouldn't want anything and wouldn't have the drive to take action if there were no such good. Therefore, there must be a final goal or benefit that we pursue for its own sake. To make this dynamism real, virtue is also required. To make the right choice, we need virtue.

Aquinas generally considers voluntary action to be an action that always strives for what is viewed as good. Most likely, we can also assume that someone intentionally aims for anything bad. However, Aquinas did not dispute the possibility of evil intent on people's parts. But he believes that even if it's not the case, when we take voluntary action, our goal is to do something positive.[1] He continued by adding that everyone wants what is good, yet he does not believe that voluntary activity must only be performed with an eye toward the end in mind. For instance, I might wish to lose weight, but in deliberately attempting to do so, I will also need to choose how to do so. Should I simply starve myself or go on a diet that will make me lose weight safely? According to Aquinas, if one is willing toward an end, one is likewise willing toward that which is toward it (Aquinas, 1961).

Humans are solid beings with bodies and souls that exist to give to and receive from others. Aquinas believed that the soul is related to acts of existence. The act of existence for the soul is unique. The body is necessary for the soul, which was created as a material. The relationship between the human and the soul is essential. As a result, the human being actualized itself through action. We can therefore state that man is what he can be through activity.

**2. Faculties and its Potentiality of the Human Person**

Any "possibility" that a thing is said to hold is covered by the concept of potentiality that I'm trying to describe broadly. All possibilities, in Aristotle's view, are not equivalent. There are some things that have the potential to become authentic on their own without any interference. Aristotle claims that the basic definition of "potency" refers to "potency as the source of change in another being, even within the same creature, but as another," and "potency as the source of motion, or active potency."[2] There is also another type of potency called 'passive.' It is a potency of being acted upon (Krapiec, 1983, p. 304). The principle of being changed by another (*principium patiendiabalio)*

Aquinas provides the most in-depth analysis of this topic of the principle of change into being in the second half of the Summa Theologiae. In that passage, he says that reason is made up of two faculties: cognitive and appetitive. The ability to know and understand things is a function of the cognitive capacity of man, or intellect. The mind also permits us to recognise a thing's goodness. As the appetitive power of reason, the will is also known. Aquinas describes the will as an innate yearning for the known good. That is to say, it is an appetite that responds to judgments of what is desirable or wise to choose'' (Aquinas, 1993).

The illustration of this viewpoint holds that the acts of the will depend on earlier acts of the intellect; the intellect must give the will the appropriate aim for which the latter is oriented. The reason why the good that is comprehended is the object of the will, which is moved as an end, is that it is the object of the intellect that moves the will afterwards. It defines how a human being can be fulfilled. Thomas agreed that the term "rational animal" applied to humans. It implies that people have a spiritual, universalizing intelligence that allows them to understand reality. Will exists in people as well. This faculty has been instructed to behave for the greater good. Using the relationship between intelligence and will (Aquinas, 1993).

**Types of Intellect**

The first intellect is the *speculative intellect* which is used to obtain knowledge, to understand and to explain reality. They operate on judgements, definitions and syllogisms. According to Aquinas, all the activities of the speculative intellect are regulated by self- evident principle. These principles are immediately known as soon as the intellect grasps any reality. We could formulate such principle as 'Being is,' 'Being is what it is.' The speculative intellect deals solely with what is i.e. a search of truth of things and so functions basically on knowing faculty (Aquinas, 1993).

The second type of intellect is the *practical intellect* which is used to make a decision as regard to action. The practical intellect co-oporate with the will because it deals with what is to be done. The practical intellect is ordered to action, and all action is purposeful. The practical intellect begins with the end i.e. the good or happiness. The first principle of the practical Reason is 'Good is to be done and evil avoided.' Aquinas discusses that our actions are set on willing. In this sense, the will is moved by the 'intellect.' Aquinas also suggest, be sparked off by our emotion called 'sensitive appetite. He also thinks that we are thought of as self- movers when we act voluntarily (Aquinas, 1954). To act voluntarily is to do what we want to do and not what something else makes us do. We can be move because of something apart from us

that we desire. Furthermore, to act voluntarily is to act from within. Aquinas thinks God is working in us base on the following reasons: since we will because of a power of our rational soul which is created by God. Second, since to will is to be moved by goodness as such, which is nothing other than God (Aristotle, 1999).

By Aquinas, God moves our will in such a way that it is not predetermined to one object. It motion remains contingent and not necessary, except for the things on which it is set by the burden of its nature. His intention was to show that to will something is to desire it and also acting voluntarily means desiring an end and taking a step to achieve it. Aquinas also note that when we will an intermediate goal as a means to an end we are willing both the intermediate goal and the end that we take it to lead to when achieved. i.e. I pick up the phone in order to talk to you; I am willing both the talking to you and the picking up of the phone in one intention (Aristotle, 1995).However, my intention to act is not only determined by the numerous things I end up doing. According to Krapiec, the will can be looked at from a twofold dimension: namely, the will which is understood as acting, i.e. the manifestation of one's personality and the expression of the character of our ago. Second, we analyse the character of human rationality in a strictly philosophical sense which is ultimately decisive of the formation of the human being (Davies, 2014, p. 158). The will functions as a synthesis of different psychic states: imagination, ideas, inclinations, desires and biological-unconscious dispositions. The will which is broadly understood forms the personality of the human person. The will sometimes when dispose to a psychic state experience inner peace. The will can be expressed in different ways. First it can be regarded as a personality which forms the harmonious arrangement of various psychic factors related to personal good. Second, when inner conflicts appear, our will is turn to a different psychic aim.

This conflict by some thinkers from the social circle of Durkheim, which occurs in our consciousness, describes the will as the personality of the human person. This inner conflict makes a decision in accord with it. Moreover, we experience in ourselves a kind of desire directed towards good which is known intellectually insofar as the object is both material and immaterial. Further, sometimes we entertain in ourselves such aims that demand self- mastery i.e. the apology of one person to another, albeit this act demands humbling oneself (Aquinas, 1954). The psychic tendencies towards the good are strictly base on the will. The will cannot be reduced to other known purely cognitive, psychic power, since the entitative character of the cognitive processes and affective- sensory tendencies is completely different form that of the spiritual- psychic tendency toward the good cognized intellectually. The spiritual –psychic tendency toward the good, organizing and not excluding various sensory- appetitive tendencies that sometimes in struggle must be overcome in the name of the good seen intellectually, is in a strict sense the will united directly with intellectual knowledge, together with which it constructs the spiritual, personal image of the individual (MacDonald, 1991, p. 61).

Hence the person through knowledge and the will is capable of organizing itself in decisions.

In the classical philosophy, Aquinas distinguished two kinds of act of the will which is ordered intellectually in a perceived good. It comprised the emanated acts and the dictated acts (MacDonald, 1991, p. 61). The emanated acts have the will directly for it cause, and therefore called voluntary acts, which has a perceived aim to the good whose source is the

will. Such natural act are, desire, joy, sadness, hope etc. Apart from the natural act which is directly brought by the will, there exist acts dictated by the will which are performed by other powers of the human person i.e. reason, the motor powers, the hand. Having in view the natural acts, voluntary and dictated by the will, and executed by other psychic or motor powers, one can notice that the dictated are subject to coercion.

Aristotelian conceptions of living things are also influential on Aquinas' meta-ethics. Aristotle's theory that living beings are composites of matter and substantial form is echoed by Thomas Aquinas. He refers to "substantial form" as a concept that arranges matter into a discrete substance endowed with specific capabilities. According to this theory, a thing's substantial form determines what nature it possesses; it is the metaphysical characteristic that gives a substance the properties that distinguish a species from others (MacDonald, 1991).

Aquinas continues by claiming that every substance strives for self-perfection. Simply put, they all seek a full realisation of the state of being or actuality as their ultimate goal. However, a substance cannot accomplish that ultimate goal without using the abilities that come with its substantial form. The end, completion, or perfection of a natural substance is its having fully actualized its specifying ability (or power), which is when it is genuinely carrying out the activity for which its form or nature offers the capacity, according to Scott MacDonald (MacDonald, 1991).Additionally, material reached its goal (perfection) by correctly using the abilities that define its species. And since Aquinas holds that existence and goodness share a referent, it would seem that the right application of those capacities likewise contributes to the goodness of that thing. Since the activity that makes up a substance's entire actuality (end) is made up of an end as good, it follows that the activity or condition itself makes up the substance's good.

The second faculty connected with potentiality which Aquinas discusses in the *Summa* is the 'emotion.' Emotion is translated as '*passionesanimae* (Cajetan, 1964). Our lives are creatures experiencing emotion. People undergo emotions as acted on and they react base on what is around them. We have emotion according to Aquinas because we are physical being which exist in a physical world that impinges on us and to what we react as things capable of understanding. According to some thinkers, they believe emotion is a non- material occurrence which takes place in our mind or in our souls and they are considered as non-material thing. The understanding by Aquinas was quite different. He did not believe that, persons are purely immaterial substances. Aquinas thinks of human soul as informing human body (Davies, 1992).Emotions are referred to as a passion for the soul.

The passions of the soul are accompanied with physical changes in us. We cannot imagine purely intellectual beings like God and angels to undergo emotions because they are not material. We are prone to emotion simply because we belong to a genre of animals. While non- rational being cannot experience emotion. Aquinas also thinks that in some cases I can control my emotions to enable me act contrary to the ways in which my natural instinct inclines me to act. He didn't think of emotion as purely introspective act. Human emotion appears the way the world is to us.

There is an intellectual or cognitive element lying which lies behind all human emotion which is different from the effect that we feel from the things in the world that act on us so as to

produce sensations in us. In Aquinas' opinion, emotions also arise in us as reactions to things in the world. Such reactions are passive to what brings them about. Their reaction in us is either being moved by either ways of attraction or aversion. Albeit we can control our emotions, and he thinks that emotions can sometimes be causally effective; for instance, when fear leads us to run away from a potentially threatening object (Davies, 2014).

Emotion is not necessarily triggered by what is seen before us. Aquinas at this point differentiated between emotion and sensation. Human emotion has some physiological aspect to which change is involved in our bodily state which arises from the fact that we are repelled by the things in the world as beings that have sensory desires and aversion, as well as intellectual ones (Gilson, 2002). Take an instance when one is thinking of the fact that, while one might dispassionately acknowledge the fact that bears can kill people, one's being in the grip of fear when confronted with bears, comes with a racing pulse, fast breathing, and sweating. When we have such intuition about bear, seeing them becomes a threat to one's well-being. Aquinas believes that people are influence by reason, imagination or even voluntary act and this can be displayed when it comes to immediate emotional reaction.

Aquinas maintained two types of emotion. This was taken from the Aristotelian Latin translation namely, 'concupiscible' (*concupiscibilis*) helps us to catch sensual good connected with pleasure. The 'aggressive' (*irascible*) is connected with hard good. This means that we see a good but the good is hard to get. This distinction was to show some emotions comes as we desire or dislike certain things, while others find obstacle on our way as we go about desiring or disliking things. On one hand, concupiscible emotions are a response to desirable things. While aggressive emotions arise in us as an obstacle to obtain what we desire. We need virtues to govern these desires. Since we are composed beings, i.e. being composed of soul and body, we need virtues to actualise these faculties. Concupiscible emotions are divided into six pairs contrary to each other. The concupiscible emotions are, love *(amor*) and hate (*odium*), desire (*desiderium*) and aversion (*fuga*), and joy (*gaudium*) and sorrow or pain (*tristitia or dolor*). While the aggressive emotions are hope (*spes*) and desire (*desperatio*), confidence *(audacio*), fear *(timor*), and anger (*ira*) (Owens, 1963, p. 252). Anger has no contrary emotion because from anger, we can just cease to be angry.

In a nutshell, Human essence understood as potentiality is the ground for the self-actualization of man. Rather than a barrier for man's self- expression and freedom, it supplies the ontological ground through which all these human determinations are feasible. But how can man realize his self-determinations, if in the very first instance he is not a subject with his distinguished essence? ''An essence is the principle of potentiality, determination and limitation, the universal human essence makes possible the human individual's self-creation as an actualization and realization of the human essence as his own essence'' (Krapiec, 1983). Consequently since an essence is the primary need in the cause of being, the specifically human essence of the human individual does not only renders his self—creation a free and responsible one but also some existentialists, particularly Sartre criticized the conception of human essence as hindrance to man's freedom and self-creation.

**3. Purposefulness of the Human Person**

The goal of human purpose is to reach perfection. In metaphysical terms, beauty is perfection. It combines the elements of good and truth. Perfection in anthropology refers to behaviour

that is in line with the goal. To achieve this complete perfection is to be purposeful. It has a relationship to the metaphysical reality of our being. Perfectionism promotes morality in us. Aristotelian eudaimonism and Christian theology are at least two seemingly incompatible traditions that are combined in St. Thomas Aquinas' moral philosophy.

On the one hand, Aquinas adheres to the classical tradition of Aristotle in believing that a deed is good or bad depending on whether it encourages or deters us from achieving our true human end, or telos, or the ultimate objective toward which all deeds are aimed. Eudaimonia, or happiness, is that telos, where "happiness" is understood in terms of accomplishment, perfection, or contentment. To be happy, however, requires a variety of moral and intellectual qualities that help us understand what happiness is and motivate us to pursue it in a dependable manner. Human conduct serves as the last justification for determining the purposefulness of the human being.

When we speak of persons, it is also In the Aristotelian tradition, every action and desire has a purpose (Krapiec, 1983). Ends are conceived, by their seekers to be desired goods thus every end is a good one; no action or capacity exists without sense. Since the good is the end in every capacity, it follows that the end of the best desire will be the best good (Aquinas, 2002). Therefore, comprehended good occurs in all the categories-in substance, quality, quantity, time, place, and relation. It is thus obvious from the Aristotelian categories that the term 'good' is used in different senses. Although usually we speak about good ends subjectively, in other words, relatively to ourselves, and the word 'good' is not univocal, it is possible to specify the objective sense of good.

By Aristotle and Aquinas such a good is understood as that at which all activities are aimed. It means that particular kinds of actions are done for the sake of attaining various ends. Also human action is ordered to an end; we act for the sake of an end insofar as we have a reason for action. There are some ends for the sake of which all actions are performed (Aquinas, 2002). Aristotle envisaged man's good in terms of object of human action, as the end of human action, the goal to which human person tend. This concept of good is called teleological concept of good. *Teleos* comes from a Greek word meaning "the end."

On the base of this thought in Middle Ages St. Thomas Aquinas has distinguished between honest good (*bonum honestum*), useful good (*bonum utile*), and desirable good (*bonum delectabile*). By Aristotle, it can also be said that good is used in reference to honourable entities, praiseworthy actions and excellent capacities (MacDonald, 1991). In a sense, we can speak of the honourable entities, as the most excellent and as such supremely good or even divine being. To this supreme good, we can consider the highest of *bonum honestum* but also it is the highest of the proper objects of desire to which the soul, through its capacities, is attracted. In this particular sense, there can be a coincidence of the *bonum honestum* and *bonum delectabile.* We may say that the ultimate end is that beyond which the agent seeks nothing else (Cajetan, 1964).

The highest good therefore fulfils the desires of the seekers of good as the highest end. This relation of the highest good and the desire for the highest good is the first principle of happiness since happiness is taken to be the fulfilment of the highest end which is sought after. From another perspective, the seeking of this fulfilment requires the use of good means

to the effect that *bonum utile,* is related to the other two kinds of good. We can express this tripartite relationship in terms of causality whereby the highest good is taken to be the final good (final cause) which draws the attraction of human subject by virtue of its nature (formal cause) such that the seeker or human subject in search of fulfilment, actively (efficient cause) uses those means (material cause) which will help him or her achieve this delight.

This schema is exemplified in search of any good whatsoever, for instance a man who is in search of honour or reputation first considers it as an excellent good (final cause), and the good nature (formal cause) of honour appeals to him as desirable. Hence he engages himself (efficient cause) in honourable activities (material cause) in order to obtain honour included that we speak of rational beings since persons are said thereof only of beings which are of rational nature. By rationality, persons participate in the 'personal' nature of a rational Creator since without rationality; products or creatures of an efficient causality would lack purposes or ends. Since the world is a cosmos, an ordered rational system, it has to be the case that its maker is a rational being. Human beings can recognize this order or purpose because of our rationality and so persons are said to be "value-reading" beings due in fact to such capacity for rationality.

Our rational nature makes us read out the ultimate values, namely happiness in such a way that non-rational beings cannot be said to be happy since they cannot read out values and ends. Values and ends imply the author of the goods about whose ends we recognize hence we not only find values as fulfilling but also we are ultimately fulfilled in finding the author of these goods of value, namely God. The human being is said to be an image of God due to the capacity for acts of rational cognition of God's goods as ordered (cosmos) towards ends (purposes), that is, ends of creatures. Indirectly, through the fulfilment or felicity which man derives from the goods (effects or works) authored by an efficient Creator, man also comes to a more fundamental recognition of the author of those goods, God, without whom those value-goods (ordered to an end - cosmos) would not have existed. Happiness is thus more ultimately realized in finding God than in finding God's works.

This last claim still does not capture clearly what Aquinas ultimately wants to show, namely, that there is a*single* end for the sake of which all of us act (Aquinas, 1961). To put the matter starkly as possible, Aquinas wants to prove that *every* human act of *every* human being is for the sake of a *single* end that is the same for *everyone (Aquinas, 1993).* The former argument which I presented did not need us to think that the ultimate end for which man act is the same for every person. It neither presented that the end at which every human being is directed comprise in a certain, solitary good (as opposed to a constellation of goods). But let us ask in what ways is this last end at which we aim? As we saw in the preceding section, all of us seek after our own perfection (Aquinas, 2004). We do so by presenting actions we feel will directly or indirectly supply to or facilitate man's life that is more complete or fulfilling than it would be in other respect. In other words, the last end—the end or good that we desire for its own sake—is happiness, whereby "happiness" Aquinas means the sort of perfection or fulfilment just describe

Nonetheless, to say that happiness is the reward of God to believers, it is not altogether a religious question but more so, it is an affirmation of man's final realization of his end in the daily approximations we make towards actualizations of our potencies. The highest of such

potencies for man as person can be considered as that which makes us as close as possible, similar to the highest of personal beings, namely God. All beings in so far as they are creatures of God, tend to a similarity with God but in the case of man, who is a person, it is obvious that he is ontologically similar to other personal beings and as such his fulfilment is by nature to be directed in the nature which is adequate to a personal end.

The personal end life of man, when viewed from the ultimate standpoint must is an experience of a personal happiness as well. Admittedly, this claim is fairly abstract and uncontroversial. In any case Aquinas does not agree that the realization of happiness consists in the thing in which it is realized. His aim is to demonstrate simply that there is something everyone strongly long and follows, namely, ultimate fulfilment (happiness). He state clearly that "*Everyone* wants the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment (perfection) in which the last end consists (Aristotle, 1999).To elucidate, ''the idea of the last end is, as MacDonald explains, a "formal concept…of the complete and perfect good, that which completely satisfies desire'' (Aquinas, 1981). So what is the reason everyone acts for the sake of such an end abstractly conceived, Aquinas discovered that there is considerable objection over what it is in which happiness consists (Davies, 2014).

The idea of the ultimate end (for which everyone acts) and the idea of a specific object, in which the ultimate end is composed as thinking, are two different concepts. For some people, the thought of the last thing they want to do is to acquire material things like wealth, fame, or power. Others define these goods as those related to the body, such as pleasures of the flesh and beauty. In the same vein, acquiring commodities for the soul like wisdom, virtue, and friendship is a component of happiness. But despite the fact that some of these excellent (especially those in the latter group) are admirable, they are always plagued by particular flaws that prevent them from offering the kind of total fulfilment that is characteristic of that good.

There is not a single item we desire that cannot have a justifiable worth when understood and guided by reason. Here on earth, we want physical well-being and material things because they foster mental activities that lead to the pursuit of the purest enjoyment (Aquinas, 1993).Our friends are there to receive our good deeds; they provide us with opportunities to acquire virtue or to perfect it.

In what way then is our last end really consists or actualized? According to the thought of Aquinas the ultimate end of man can *only* be turned in that perfectly good, which is God. As a matter of fact, God is the perfect goodness of all things and has the capacity of satisfying our heart's deepest desire and necessitating the perfection at which we aim. As he attest that human beings "attain their last end by knowing and loving God (Aristotle, 2014). This ultimate goal, the condition that comprises complete happiness, is known by Aquinas as the beatific vision. The beatific vision is defined as a miraculous union between man and God, whose joy exceeds the fulfilment offered by those things humans occasionally associate with the last end. If the beatific vision is the source of complete happiness, why is it impossible for man to achieve it? In actuality, everyone does seek it—at least in part.

All of us seek our own perfection, which is equivalent to ultimate bliss, as we've already established. Unfortunately, a lot of our activities are motivated by false perceptions of what

true happiness entails. These opinions are the result of some sort of intellectual or cognitive error, such as holding certain opinions owing to ignorance or poorly thought out decisions. But in a similar way, certain appetitive excesses that distort our perception of what is truly good will lead to our incorrect beliefs. In this situation, excellences or virtues are necessary for good action of the mind and hunger.

This desire originates with wonder, and does not rest until the mind is able to grasp the essence of the cause. This is why the natural desire to know is related to the problem of the happiness of the human being. Part of happiness involves the mind's grasping the essence of the First Cause: this is the way a human being attains his perfection. Man is only fulfilled when the intellect receives God as the object of its desiring. As shown in the first chapter of the work the concept of the human person, it is well known, St. Thomas followed Boethius definition of person. As pointed above person as defined by Boethius refers to an individual substance of rational nature.

An entity that is complete in itself and can stand alone is called substance. It is something which remains constant through change and is affected by operations and properties. The ontological makeup or essence of a person is represented by the Boethian concept of person. It definitely demonstrates an essential determination as opposed to an existential one. Additionally, it depicts the existential aspect of the human person in the categories and tenets of Aquinas' realist and existentialist metaphysics.

The person is a physical spiritual being made up of an essence, a soul, and intellectual and reasoning faculties. As a result, the terms "person" and "bodily spiritual being" have the same ontological meaning. The type of personality a person has connects to their level of physical spirituality. Boethius' concept of a person is concise but profound. Even if the idea of the essence of a person has been the subject of numerous arguments and descriptions, even though it is overly conceptual, it is still tenable today. This definition was accepted by Aquinas. But we find that this idea is rejected by others for a number of reasons. They first contend that man is a mystery that defies categorization. Second, the individual is imperceivable, and third, the metaphysical explanation or concept of person is notional, and is, therefore, unfitting for denoting the concrete human individual.

**Conclusion**

Man is a mystery and a paradox in himself. To demonstrate that he is free from any definition in the sense that we cannot say anything sensible about his essence is unreasonable. We acknowledge the limitation of a metaphysical definition, since man is not just a concept and is not simply a metaphysical reality, but a concrete human individual, and then a metaphysical definition is inadequate. It is the sole reason why man has to be shown and defined as a concreted individual subject having existence. This is not why the study of metaphysics has to abandon completely, for after all, man is a being.

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