Sapientia Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Development Studies (SGOJAHDS), Vol.2 No.1 March, 2019; p.g. 72 – 82; ISSN: 2695-2319 (Print); ISSN: 2695-2327 (Online)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA/MIDDLE EAST FOREIGN POLICY AND GLOBAL SECURITY FROM 2001-2008

NWOBODO JERRY C.
General Studies Division,
Enugu State University of Science and Technology,
Agbani, Enugu, Nigeria.

ABSTRACT
This study examines the United states of America/Middle East Foreign Policy and the issues of global security within the period of 2001-2008. The world today looks at the United States as the pace setter in almost all aspects of life endeavours vis a vis foreign policy formulations, directions and global security. The Middle East too, especially Israel and Palestine, has been a global concern following its possession of the gulf oil which according to Tillman (1982) necessitated the United States' interest and influence over the question of Palestine. With the new State of Israel in place in 1948, the United States was the first to recognize it. The question is whether the United States/ Middle East foreign Policy reduced the incident of global terrorism. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the world trade center and the pentagon in the United States that is seen as the police of the world with all its security agencies heighten the curiosity of researchers. This work employed the methodology of content Analysis of the data sourced from publications, documentaries and the internet. Therefore this paper is a theoretical contribution to knowledge and an addition to the existing literature in the field of global terrorism with a call to governments and policy makers on the ways to end terrorism, local and global.

Keywords: Terrorism, Global Security, Foreign Policy, United States of America, Middle East.

INTRODUCTION
Although the United States' (U.S.) interest in the Middle East can be traced to the early years of the American Republic, the region has been a principal focus of U.S. foreign policy since World War II. Oil investments and the special U.S. relationship with Israel were the chief reasons for U.S. involvement in that area of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Tillman (1982) contends that in 1946, the United States began to exert its influence over the question of Palestine with a proposal for an Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry. This group recommended the immediate entry into Palestine of 100,000 survivors of the Holocaust, who were still languishing in displaced-person camps long after the war's end, largely because of the refusal of European countries and the United States to admit them. This recommendation undermined the efforts of the British, who were struggling to maintain their commitments to their Arab clients in the region while confronting the growing insurrection of the Yishuv in Palestine. By 1947, Britain was forced to give up this impossible task and handed the question of Palestine over to the United Nations. In the U.N. General Assembly's consideration of the question in 1947, the United States played a decisive role in the passage of Resolution 181, which partitioned Palestine and allowed for the creation of Jewish and Arab states. When Israel came into existence in May 1948, the United States was the first country to extend recognition to it.

A consistent pattern in American relations with the Middle East thus emerged. The United States championed the cause of Israel while slowly replacing Britain as the major Western patron of conservative Arab regimes. The stresses of accommodating both an increasingly close relationship with Israel and ties with Arab states that were at war with Israel have marked American relations with the Arab world ever since. Relations became particularly acute during the Suez War of 1956, when the United States opposed the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in spite of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's antipathy for the nationalist regime of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser.

During this crisis, the desire to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting the situation was probably uppermost in the minds of American policymakers, rather than the specifics of the Arab-Israeli conflict. American preoccupation with the growth of Soviet
influence in the region became another consistent pattern during the next three decades, one that Israel increasingly

benefited from, in the form of American financial, military, and diplomatic support. This support escalated particularly sharply following the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, after which the United States became Israel's main supplier of advanced weaponry.

Enhanced American commitment to Israel was one of the major results of the growing polarization of the Middle East along cold war lines in the 1950s and 1960s. Several Arab states aligned themselves more closely with the Soviet Union, and other regional states, including Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco, grew closer to the United States. This trend transcended the boundaries of the Arab-Israeli conflict, however, as was evidenced by the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, which committed the United States to come to the aid of any state threatened by "international communism." In this highly polarized situation, the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War broke out, creating a set of problems for U.S. policy, most of which have persisted to the present day. Foremost among them has been the task of reconciling American sympathy and support for Israel with a desire to maintain a strong footing in Arab countries resentful of Israel's unwillingness to evacuate territories occupied during the 1967 war. This problem was partly alleviated by Egypt's shift from a pro-Soviet to a pro-American orientation after 1970 and by the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979. But it persists because other aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, notably the Palestinian-Israeli dimension, have not been resolved.

While the United States was involved in efforts to resolve the Egyptian-Israeli aspect of this conflict in the wake of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, renewed importance was being attached to another American ally in the Middle East, Iran under the regime of the Shah. Iran became the focus of the Nixon Doctrine of 1972, whereby in the wake of the Vietnam War experience, the United States laid greater stress on arming powerful regional allies. With American support, the shah embarked on a massive program to upgrade the Iranian military and turn his country into a regional superpower. This process both exacerbated tensions with Iran's neighbors, notably Iraq, and alienated elements among the Iranian public who were already highly critical of their nation's subordination to the United States and the shah's dictatorial rule over the country.

Thus the main thrust of this study is to examine the US Middle-East foreign policy and the issue of global security within the period of 2001-2008.

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

The United States of America is generally known as the police of the globe. This is because of its use of her specialized security agencies like the C.I.A, FBI and INTERPOL. A renewed vigour was attached to the US global watch-dog role following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the twin towers - World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The enormity of the attack is unprecedented in that in addition to the edifices destroyed, over three thousand lives and properties worth millions of dollars were lost.

As it is to be expected, the Islamic fundamentalist group - Al Qaeda, was pointed out as the mastermind of the attacks. Having much of its support base in the Middle-East, the American government declared its intention to bring the accomplices to justice. This was what necessitated the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Bearing in mind that policies often have unforeseen consequences, many scholars have looked at whether the fall-outs emanating from the US war on terrorism have not in any way raised much more global security problems than it has solved. These scholars include Prados (2001), Lesser, Nardulli and Arghavan (2004), Luft (2002), Kochler (2008), Bargezar (2009).

None of these scholars however looked at the aspect of global security with a view to finding out whether the US/Middle-East foreign policy has reduced the incidence of global terrorism. This study will fill this gap in the literature using the following question:

Has the US/Middle-East foreign policy reduced the incidence of global terrorism?

OBJECTIVES OF STUDY

The general objective of this study is to examine the US/Middle-East foreign policy and global security from 2001 to 2008. On the other hand, the specific objective of this study is to investigate whether the US/Middle-East foreign policy has reduced the incidence of global terrorism.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Following in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, greater attention have been accorded to the issue of global security. This is because it was seemingly very easy for the perpetrators to

carry out the nefarious attacks without any of the United States' state-of-the-art security surveillance equipment detecting them. The resultant war on terror have continued giving rise to increasing security concern not just in the United States alone, but also in the world in general.

This study is timely as it seeks to establish whether US foreign policy in the Middle-East have in any way reduced the incidence of global terrorism. This is the theoretical contribution to knowledge. Also, it will add to the existing literature in the field of global terrorism.

On the practical side, this study will be of immense value to government and policy-makers as it will serve as a policy guide. This is essential in a bid to highlight the need to weigh possible policy outcomes before its implementation. Again, this study will be beneficial to students and researchers wishing to carry out further research on the issue of global terrorism.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This review will focus on the issue of the US/Middle-East foreign policy and global security 2001-2008. Prados (2001) focused his analysis on the Middle East Attitudes toward the United States. He noted that the United States has enjoyed close relations with Arab and Muslim states in the Middle East since the region emerged in its present configuration after the two world wars. U.S. economic and military assistance has played a major role in the development of important regional states such as Egypt and Jordan. Oil rich countries in the Persian Gulf region have been essential suppliers of energy resources to the United States and its industrial allies and major purchasers of U.S. commercial and military equipment. These ties have helped create a network of organizational relationships, official and personal contacts, bilateral economic and military commissions, and joint commercial endeavors between the United States and friendly countries in the Middle East.

Despite this extensive cooperation, serious tensions have often marred U.S. relations with Arabs and Muslims in the Middle East, both at governmental and popular levels. Some governments and sub-national groups in the region are avowedly hostile to the United States, oppose its policies on a broad spectrum of issues, and seek to damage U.S. interests in the region, sometimes through violence. This is particularly true of those governments that the U.S. State Department identified as supporters of international terrorism, as well as a number of militia-type groups that the State Department lists as foreign terrorist organizations. Even friendly governments in the Middle East are ambivalent in their relations with the United States, either because they disagree with specific aspects of U.S. policy (such as the Arab-Israeli conflict) or because they are constrained by anti-U.S. sentiment within their own populations.

Popular attitudes are even more complex and difficult to assess. The image of the United States as a "land of milk and honey" as well as a land of freedom and opportunity co-exists with another image of moral decadence and hostility to Islamic society in the minds of many residents of the Middle East. These conflicting images can lead to wide swings in popular attitudes toward the United States. The friendliness that many Americans encounter in casual contacts with ordinary citizens of Middle East countries can turn quickly to hostility and, on occasion, to violence when the United States adopts a policy seen by locals as inimical to Arab or Muslim interests.

Continuing, he noted that The United States fell heir to a complex relationship that developed between Islamic society and the west over a period of 14 centuries, although the various Islamic empires that existed during that lengthy period were sometimes allied with one or more European states. Islamic-western relations tended to be a story of conflict: the early Arab conquests after the emergence of the Islamic religion; the European-led crusades from the 11th to 13th centuries; the expansion of the Ottoman Turkish empire into southeastern Europe in the 15th and 16th; and the establishment of colonial or quasi-colonial regimes over much of the Arab world by France, Britain, and to a lesser extent Italy in the 19* and early 20th. As Arab states acquired full independence following World War II, their citizens continued to harbor strong sensitivities over anything that suggested "western imperialism." Iran, occupied by

Britain and the Soviet Union during World War II, retained similar sensitivities toward any form of interference from external powers.

The United States, a latecomer to the Middle East, enjoyed a more favorable image in the region than did its European counterparts in the 19* and early 20th centuries. With the brief exception of the Barbary wars, the United States was not involved in any regional conflict and had no discernable colonial ambitions in the region. U.S. visitors-mainly educators, travelers, and diplomatic envoys-were well received on the whole. A high point in regional perceptions of the United States may have been reached at the end of World War I, when inhabitants of the Middle East welcomed President Woodrow Wilson's call for self-determination and some of them saw in the United

States a potential counterweight to the colonial ambitions of France and Britain.

This period of minimal U.S. involvement in the Middle East came to an end after World War II, as the United States undertook expanded worldwide commitments and acquired three major interests in the Middle East region: maintaining access to the region's oil resources, blocking Soviet attempts to achieve hegemony in the Middle East, and safeguarding the security of the newly created state of Israel. Pursuit of these interests compelled the United States to become an active player in Middle East affairs and adopt periodically conflicting policies that were sometimes resented in the region. In particular, the U.S. role in the creation of Israel in 1948 was decried among most Arabs and Muslims, who believed that a Palestinian state should have been set up in the disputed territory.

Moreover, in the decades that followed, U.S. policy collided with the two principal political movements in the region: secular pan-Arab nationalism, which was spread by the late Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, and Islamic fundamentalism, which began to replace secular nationalism in the 1970s. Both movements to varying degrees developed anti-western and anti-Israeli underpinnings. A discussion of Islamic fundamentalist movements (sometimes referred to as Islamism, Islamic resurgence, or political Islam) is beyond the scope of this report; however, three points are worth noting. First, Islamic fundamentalism is not monolithic; it is espoused by a number of groups that vary in orientation and intensity.

Second, the more militant fundamentalist groups with a penchant for violence have shown considerable drawing power among youth and lower middle classes. Third, the efforts of more extreme fundamentalists to undermine pro-U.S. regimes in the region, oppose Arab-Israeli peacemaking, and promote international terrorism have increasingly put Islamic fundamentalists at odds with the United States.

Attitudes toward the United States among Muslims and Arabs of the Middle East appear to be mixed. In the absence of reliable or consistent polling data, the extent and depth of opposition to the United States are hard to measure. Anecdotal evidence is varied and contradictory. One commentator, writing in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, opined that "only a hard core of Muslim fanatics hates us enough to kill themselves and thousands of others ..." (Holger, 2001 :A9).

Another commentator, while noting that the vast majority of Muslims and Arabs were shocked and horrified by the attacks, goes on to say that "a mood of resentment toward America" has become so commonplace in Middle East countries "that it was bound to breed hostility, and even hatred". Contrasting viewpoints appear to exist side by side, and reflect long standing ambivalence in regional attitudes toward the United States. Some individuals who express admiration for U.S. values such as freedom and opportunity often criticize aspects of American popular culture. Likewise, some who praise U.S. democracy may at the same time condemn U.S. policies on issues related to Israel and Iraq.

There are noteworthy differences between governmental attitudes and popular attitudes toward the United States, and some commentators believe that popular attitudes are winning out in their ability to influence regional policies. Most Middle East governments tend to see public opinion as a potential threat to the status quo. Friendly governments like those of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, are economically or strategically dependent on U.S. ties and will go to considerable lengths to support or acquiesce in U.S. policies even when they are domestically unpopular. Even less friendly governments, while using or instigating popular sentiment as a means of attacking specific U.S. policies, are uneasy over popular movements they see as threats to their regimes; Syria, for example, has long suppressed the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood. Both friendly and hostile governments, however, seem to feel increasingly

constrained by popular attitudes. To an increasing extent, they are walking a fine line between attempting to control popular attitudes and seeking to coopt them.

Popular sentiment, on the other hand, operates under no such constraints. Often referred to as "the Arab street" (which loosely includes public opinion in non-Arab Iran as well), this popular sentiment has benefitted over the years from a steady expansion in the reach, availability, and sophistication of media outlets. In the late 1950s, the proliferation of transistor radios did much to spread the vision of Arab nationalism propagated by then Egyptian President Nasser. Twenty years later, cassette tapes enabled the late Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini to enlist supporters for his campaign to establish an Islamic republic in Iran. In recent years, the emergence of videotapes and satellite television has popularized Islamic fundamentalist views that in some cases have fueled outbreaks of terrorism. A political scientist in the Middle East observes that the Arab street is becoming increasingly Islamized and adds: "The street counts" (Kifner, 2001:1,5).

A key question which defies easy answers is the degree to which "the street" is hostile to the United

States. The strongly Islamist orientation which seems to be a current feature of the street can easily be translated into anti-U.S. sentiment at the hands of skilled manipulators like Osama bin Laden. As explained below, U.S. policy has frequently been at variance with prevailing popular sentiment in the Middle East. A Saudi journalist, discussing the popular Qatar-based Al-Jazeera TV network, commented that "[they know the taste of the Arab street, and the Arab street is anti American" (Waxman, 2001: Cl) Moreover, skepticism and a conspiratorial mentality among much of the population feed inflammatory theories that deepen popular distrust of the United States. For example, some Arab media have suggested that the September 11 attacks were carried out by the Bush Administration to solidify its hold on power.

The street is not monolithic, however, and is probably not uniformly anti-American. Attitudes seem to vary according to the background and orientation of the individuals expressing them. There are indications that those who are most attracted to Islamic fundamentalism-for example, youth, poorer classes, some professionals and intellectuals-are more likely to view the United States in an unfavorable light. Conversely, ethnic and religious minorities such as the Kurds in Iraq and some Christians in Lebanon have long regarded western nations and particularly the United States as potential protectors against Arab or Muslim majorities. In Iran, in a curious reversal of popular sentiment, opinion leaders such as intellectuals and students are now reacting against the country's hard-line clerics, who remain among the most resolute opponents of the United States. On balance, though, popular attitudes-at least among the most vocal groups—appear unfavorable toward the United States on a variety of issues.

Bargezar (2009) focused on the Iranian connection. According to him, Iran's increasing role and importance in the Middle East since the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the crisis in Iraq is primarily rooted in the growing significance of Middle Eastern issues for the international security system. Secondarily, Iran's natural geopolitical features and the cultural, religious and historical structure of its power and politics have made this country one of the most influential forces in the Middle East. The important issues of the post-9711 Middle East can be identified as the emergence of new influential variables, political-security and geopolitical developments, and the shifting roles of the players.

Magavilla (2008) focused on the Middle-East conflict. According to her, Since the first Gulf War, the gravity and graphical nature of international conflicts has reached unparallel heights. This can be attributed to the levels of sophistication, not only in military strategy and armament, but also in media coverage that enables us to see events in their rawest form as they unravel. Yet, there is nothing more common in the halls of history than conflict. It is also worth noting that there is nothing more common about history itself than the fact that it is written by the one who either wins or survives long enough to tell 'his' story. It is, as a result, much easier to make an account of events than to actually validate them.

The Middle East is no exception to this truth. So much so that unless you are a real hard line follower, it is difficult to know who is at conflict with whom, when and for what reason. Over the last century the Middle East has been ravaged by a myriad of conflicts. One of the hallmark conflicts has been that of Israel and the Arab Nations. Like the other conflicts in the world of resent time it is difficult to state what is driving this conflict still.

Despite the small physical space being covered, *this conflict,* dating back to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1917, has been at the center of international diplomacy and media reporting and has attracted the undivided attention of all the world's super powers to date; the then British Empire, the then USSR and now the USA. For whatever reason, *the Middle East conflict,* as some would like to refer to it, has been a drawn out saga with multiple parties often holding conflicting positions with time. The Israel/ Arab conflict, which now also includes the Israel/ Palestine conflict, has been characterized in many ways with some instigating that it is an underlying conflict of Western ideals versus those of the Islamic world. Others have reached the extreme of attributing the never-ending nature *of this conflict* to 'Global' interest on the oil reserves of that part of the world. Like in any other conflict there are pertinent issues at hand. For example in the Israel/ Palestine Conflict the main issues are:

(1) the status and future of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, which comprise the areas for the proposed State of Palestine;
(2) Israeli and Palestinian security;
(3) the nature of a future Palestinian State;
(4) the fate of the Palestinian refugees;
(5) the settlement policies of Israel, and the ultimate fate of settlements; and,
(6) Sovereignty over Jerusalem's holy sites, including the Temple Mount and Western

Wall complex. These unresolved issues may validate the existence of a conflict, but one may wonder what is at stake to the extent that no real resolve has been reached in all these years, she concluded.

In the same vein, Hans Kochler (2008) sees global security in the absence of a balance of power and the importance of inter-regional co-operation. He contended that No balance of power has emerged yet since the collapse of the post-World War II system of international relations. While the bipolar system of the Cold War era undoubtedly was the main reason of the paralysis of the United Nations Security Council, preventing it from exercising its mandate in the field of collective security, the rivalry between the period's two major players also served as a barrier to abuses of power by individual countries. Almost two decades since the end of the East-West conflict, it is a well-documented fact that the unipolar power constellation in our era of "globality" has led to a serious erosion of the system of collective security as it has been advocated, though imperfectly practiced, by the United Nations Organization. It is an iron law of power politics that a country in the position of global hegemon cannot be induced to act in conformity with international law, and in particular with United Nations rules and resolutions, by mere reference to those rules. In a situation in which there exists no incentive for the major global player(s) to go beyond the narrow scope of the "national interests," the legitimacy of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations is increasingly threatened. The signs of anarchy at the global level should surprise no one who is aware of the destabilizing impact of the most influential country's lack of preparedness to "play by the rules." The events that unfolded since March 2003 are clear proof of this trend which jeopardizes the international rule of law.

The question we specifically have to ask when making an assessment of the long term implications of this obvious paradigm change in international politics is what impact such a reorientation will have on regional security:

First of all, unlike in the bipolar era, regional conflicts are not anymore the playground among rival superpowers - although, it has to be admitted, regional tensions continue to be impacted by the diverging (or conflicting) interests of outside powers. Unlike during the Cold War era, regional tensions do not carry the risk of triggering a global (potentially nuclear) war.

Secondly, in sharp contrast to the previous era, regional conflicts are now even more prone to unilateral interference - since the global hegemon may be tempted to act as "guarantor of peace" according to a constellation of interests that is defined by this power alone (without consideration of the positions of other states or intergovernmental organizations). This trend is evidenced in the recent development of the "peace initiatives" related to the Israeli-Arab conflict (particularly since the Madrid Conference of 1991), but also in the turmoil in the wider Middle Eastern region that was caused by unilateral actions (more bluntly: acts of armed intervention outside the framework of the United Nations) aimed at implementing the vision of a so-called "New Middle East." Naturally, the decision on engagement in a specific region exclusively depends on the global hegemon's (unilateral) assessment, i.e. a definition, by that country itself, of its geopolitical interests that is constantly evolving and not tied to norms agreed upon by the international community.

Thirdly, we have to be aware of a destabilizing consequence of this unipolar power constellation that is almost unavoidable: namely the exposure of regions to external influences in a manner that leaves considerably less room for independent action by regional countries - unless the regional structure is highly developed at different and interdependent levels (as in the case of the European Union's multi-level co-operation in the economic, political, social and cultural fields).

However, in spite of its rather advanced regional - and in certain respects supranational - status, the European Union has also fallen victim to the global hegemon's maxim of *divide et impera*, as has become obvious even to the most optimistic observers in the course of the events preceding the Iraq invasion of 2003. In regions with less advanced organizational structures - or less cohesion — than the EU has achieved, such a development may occur even more easily and with more serious consequences for regional stability and security.

How should the members of what nowadays is euphemistically called the "international community," and in particular smaller countries, react to this new geopolitical constellation - especially when their sovereignty (external as well as internal) is concerned?

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Power Theory also known as Political Realism is the best framework within which our study is premised. The Realist approach looks at the world as it 'is' and not as it 'ought' to be. Machiavelli is the father of the realist school. Corroborating this fact, Onuoha (2008:33), affirmed that:

> "Machiavelli, in The Prince, written in 1513, offers from the standpoint of Renaissance politics, a set of prescriptions for rulers that is plainly based on a general view of the politics of princedoms, as occurring in an arena in which the strong take what they can, and the weak give what they must. It is a general understanding that is derived from Machiavelli's view of men as "fickle, lying and deceivers", by whom it is better to be feared than loved."

Morgenthau expounded this theory of Political Realism in his book; *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* Fourth Edition, Revised, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1978, pp. 4-15) using six principles of political realism which we shall hitherto, discuss in details.

1. Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure.

Realism, believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politics, must also believe in the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects, however imperfectly and one-sidedly, these objective laws. It believes also, then, in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion-between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only a subjective judgment, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking.

For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts. Thus we can find out what statesmen have actually done, and from the foreseeable consequences of their acts we can surmise what their objectives might have been.

Yet examination of the facts is not enough. To give meaning to the factual raw material of foreign policy, we must approach political reality with a kind of rational outline, a map that suggests to us the possible meanings of foreign policy. In other words, we put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances (presuming always that he acts in a rational manner), and which of
these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose. It is the testing of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives theoretical meaning to the facts of international politics.

2. The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. This concept provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood. It sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics (understood in terms of interest defined as wealth), ethics, aesthetics, or religion. Without such a concept a theory of politics, international or domestic, would be altogether impossible, for without it we could not distinguish between political and nonpolitical facts, nor could we bring at least a measure of systematic order to the political sphere.

We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out. That assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman—past, present, or future—has taken or will take on the political scene. We look over his shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we listen in on his conversation with other statesmen; we read and anticipate his very thoughts. Thinking in terms of interest defined as power, we think as he does, and as disinterested observers we understand his thoughts and actions perhaps better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself.

The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. On the side of the actor, it provides for rational discipline in action and creates that astounding continuity in foreign policy which makes American, British, or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligible, rational continuum, by and large

consistent within itself, regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen. A realist theory of international politics, then, will guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences.

To search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the motives of statesmen is both futile and deceptive. It is futile because motives are the most illusive of
psychological data, distorted as they are, frequently beyond recognition, by the interests and emotions of actor and observer alike. Do we really know what our own motives are? And what do we know of the motives of others?

It stands to reason that not all foreign policies have always followed so rational, objective, and unemotional a course. The contingent elements of personality, prejudice, and subjective preference, and of all the weaknesses of intellect and will which flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational course. Especially where foreign policy is conducted under the conditions of democratic control, the need to marshal popular emotions to the support of foreign policy cannot fail to impair the rationality of foreign policy itself. Yet a theory of foreign policy which aims at rationality must for the time being, as it were, abstract from these irrational elements and seek to paint a picture of foreign policy which presents the rational essence to be found in experience, without the contingent deviations from rationality which are also found in experience.

Deviations from rationality which are not the result of the personal whim or the personal psychopathology of the policy maker may appear contingent only from the vantage point of rationality, but may themselves be elements in a coherent system of irrationality. The conduct of the Indochina War by the United States suggests that possibility. It is a question worth looking into whether modern psychology and psychiatry have provided us with the conceptual tools which would enable us to construct, as it were, a counter-theory of irrational politics, a kind of pathology of international politics

The difference between international politics as it actually is and a rational theory derived from it is like the difference between a photograph and a painted portrait. The photograph shows everything that can be seen by the naked eye; the painted portrait does not show everything that can be seen by the naked eye. but it shows, or at least seeks to show, one thing that the naked eye cannot see: the human essence of the person portrayed.

Political realism contains not only a theoretical but also a normative element. It knows that political reality is replete with contingencies and systemic irrationalities and points to the typical influences they exert upon foreign policy. Yet it shares with all social theory the need, for the sake of theoretical understanding, to stress the rational elements of political reality; for it is these rational elements that make reality intelligible for
theory. Political realism presents the theoretical construct of a rational foreign policy which experience can never completely achieve. At the same time political realism considers a rational foreign policy to be good foreign policy; for only a rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies both with the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of success. Political realism wants the photographic picture of the political world to resemble as much as possible its painted portrait. Aware of the inevitable gap between good—that is, rational—foreign policy and foreign policy as it actually is, political realism maintains not only that theory must focus upon the rational elements of political reality, but also that foreign policy ought to be rational in view of its own moral and practical purposes.

3. Realism assumes that interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid but not with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. Power is the control of man over man. Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place. Thucydides' statement, born of the experiences of ancient Greece that "identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals" was taken up in the nineteenth century by Lord Salisbury's remark that "the only bond of union that endures" among nations is "the absence of all clashing interests.

The same observations apply to the concept of power. Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end. from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another. Power covers the domination of man by man, both when it is disciplined b> moral ends and controlled by constitutional safeguards, as in Western democracies, and when it is that untamed and barbaric force which finds its laws in nothing but its own strength and its sole justification in its aggrandizement.

Political realism does not assume that the contemporary conditions under which foreign policy operates, with their extreme instability and the ever present threat of large-scale violence, cannot be changed. The balance of power, for instance, is indeed a perennial element of all pluralistic societies, as the authors of *The Federalist* papers well knew; yet it is capable of operating, as it does in the United States, under the conditions of relative stability and peaceful conflict. If the factors that have given rise to these conditions can be duplicated on the international scene, similar conditions of stability and peace will then prevail there, as they have over long stretches of history among certain nations.

What is true of the general character of international relations is also true of the nation state as the ultimate point of reference of contemporary foreign policy. While the realist indeed believes that interest is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed, the contemporary connection between interest and the nation state is a product of history, and is therefore bound to disappear in the course of history. Nothing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of the political world into nation states will be replaced by larger units of a quite different character, more in keeping with the technical potentialities and the moral requirements of the contemporary world.

4. Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the tension between moral command and the requirements of successful political action. Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action. And it is unwilling to gloss over and obliterate that tension and thus to obfuscate both the moral and the political issue by making it appear as though the stark facts of politics were morally more satisfying than they actually are, and the moral law less exacting than it actually is.

> Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place

5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. It is the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from the moral excess and political folly.

Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All nations are tempted-and few have been able to resist the temptation for long-to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe.

6. The political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere. He asks "How does this policy affect the power of the nation?" Political realism is based on a pluralistic conception of human nature. A man who was nothing but "political man" would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. But, in order to develop an autonomous theory of political behavior, "political man" must be abstracted from other aspects of human nature.

It therefore follows that the position of the United States as the international police can best be understood in the context of American national interest. Thus the America-led global war on terror is a means of primarily meeting their primary interest. To this end, the American foreign policy in the Middle-East is defined by their national interest (often interpreted to mean the interest of the international community). What America did not take into cognizance was the effects such global war will have on American interests abroad. In other words, instead of abating, the US Middle-East foreign policy has heightened global insecurity.

HYPOTHESIS

This study is guided by the following hypothesis:

> The US/Middle-East foreign policy on global security has not reduced the incidence of global terrorism.

METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Data for this study was sourced from existing records like books, journals, United Nations documents, World Bank publications, government and other official publications, internet materials, seminar papers, newspapers, magazines as well as other related documents related to the issue of the US/Middle-East foreign

policy and global security between 2001-2008.

In this study, therefore, we employed the technique called Content Analysis. Obikeze (1990:81) contends that this technique was developed as a result of the need for a reliable scientific method for assessing, analyzing and interpreting a large variety of materials. Thus we relied mainly (though not entirely) on this analytical technique to evaluate the data generated in the course of this study.

EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION

This segment is where we seek to adduce data to test our hypothesis which states that the US/Middle-East foreign policy has not reduced the incidence of global terrorism. The deployment of U.S. and other western military forces in the Middle East strikes a discordant note among many Arabs and other Muslims in the region. Since the U.S.-led coalition expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991, the United States has maintained a force of approximately 25,000 military personnel in the Persian Gulf region, including approximately 5,000 in remote bases in Saudi Arabia. (The total figure has increased as the campaign against terrorism got under way in October 2001.) Many Arabs in the Middle East resent the presence of non-Muslim western forces, which evoke memories of European colonialism. In particular, the presence of western military forces on Saudi soil is seen by some as a desecration of the Islamic holy places of Mecca and Medina, which are located in Saudi Arabia. Significantly, the first grievance listed by Osama bin Laden in *hisfetwa* (Muslim legal opinion) of February 1998 was the U.S. military presence in the Arabian Peninsula, and this complaint seems to have resonance in the region. Even some individuals and leaders who are less concerned with the U.S. military presence on religious grounds tend to suspect a long-term U.S. plan to maintain military bases in the Middle East.

The rulers of Saudi Arabia, torn between their need for western protection against renewed aggression by Iraq and their position as guardians of the Islamic holy sites, are sensitive to any discussion of their role in hosting U.S. military personnel. To a lesser extent, the same is true of the leaders of the smaller Gulf states who, like the Saudi leadership, are vulnerable to domestic and regional criticism from opponents of a U.S. military presence. (A partial exception is Kuwait, where memories of the seven-month Iraqi occupation and the U.S. role in terminating it are still fresh). Consequently, Gulf leaders are reluctant to advertise any U.S. or other western use of bases on their territories, especially to launch allied strikes against targets in fellow Islamic states such as Iraq or more recently Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION: COUNTERVAILING CONSIDERATIONS

The United States and its allies have made efforts to avoid offending Muslim sentiment or embarrassing friendly governments in the Middle East. President Bush and senior U.S. officials have repeatedly said the war against terrorism is not aimed at the Islamic religion. The U.S. military presence is generally unobtrusive. U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, for example, are stationed at isolated locations at considerable distances from the Muslim holy sites of Mecca and Medina. All three U.S. administrations since the 1991 Gulf war have avoided detailed public discussion of U.S. troop locations, military deployments, or combat operations in an effort to avert criticism against Middle East countries hosting U.S. military contingents in the Persian Gulf region. Although many Arabs and Muslims opposed the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan, U.S. officials have stressed that most Afghans welcomed their liberation from the Taliban regime. More broadly, the United States does not have a history of seeking a large-scale military presence in the Middle East. For many years, the United State maintained only an "over-the-horizon" presence consisting of a small naval force stationed in the Persian Gulf, despite the economic and strategic importance of that region. Even since the 1991 Gulf war, the United States has tried to minimize the need for stationing forces in the region through measures that do not require permanent deployment of troops. For example, the U.S. Armed Forces have prepositioned military
equipment in several Gulf states for use in a contingency, engaged in combined military exercises, and carried out short term training missions. The United States has withdrawn from bases when requested to do so by a host government, as it did from Libya and Morocco in the 1970s. U.S. participation in regional peacekeeping operations, notably the Multinational Force and Observers established under the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979, has elicited little or no opposition within the Middle East. The U.S. role in implementing economic and military measures to contain Iraq has become increasingly unpopular in the Middle East. Regional reactions were mixed when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, but Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's accompanying denunciation of oil rich regimes resonated among many ordinary citizens, especially in less affluent Middle East countries. Since the U.S.-led coalition expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait

in 1991, public opinion in the Middle East has increasingly blamed economic sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council for the continuing hardships that the Iraqi people have suffered for the past ten years. The United States, widely seen as the principal force in maintaining sanctions, has drawn the lion's share of such criticism and is portrayed as insensitive to the plight of Iraqi citizens unable to obtain the basic necessities of life. As one commentator put it, "[w]hile many in the Arab world do not like Saddam Hussain, they believe that the United States has chosen a particularly inhuman method of fighting him-a method that is starving an entire nation".

The U.S. and British role in the military aspects of containing Iraq is also a focus of criticism in the region. Since the early 1990s, both countries have conducted regular over-flights of northern and southern Iraq to deter the regime from oppressing internal opposition groups or from threatening neighboring states. These over-flights have resulted in frequent clashes as U.S. and British aircraft have responded to challenges from Iraqi air defense units, and Iraq asserts that allied strikes have inflicted significant collateral damage. On several occasions, most notably in December 1998 (Operation Desert Fox), the United States and Britain have conducted more extensive air strikes against major Iraqi installations. Even the leaders of friendly Arab states-Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan-have deplored the use of force against Iraq and the allied strikes have been decried in local media. On the "Arab street", reactions have been even more hostile. A popular conspiratorial theory holds that the United States-despite periodic military

action against Iraq—actually wants to keep Saddam in power. According to this theory, "Saddam Hussein had been lured into Kuwait by an American green light-and then kept in power and let off the hook-so that Pax Americana would have the pretext for stationing its forces in the region."

Of particular concern to many in the region is the possibility that the United States may expand the current campaign against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban to target Iraq or possibly other Muslim countries on the State Department's terrorism list (such as Iran, Syria, or Libya). At a meeting of the 56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) on October 10, 2001, attendees refrained from criticizing the U.S. campaign against bin Laden/Taliban forces in Afghanistan but rejected the targeting of any other Arab or Muslim country. Key allies such as President Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan have urged the United States not to take this step, which they think could cause a major backlash in their countries and elsewhere in the Middle East.

REFERENCES

TEXTBOOKS

Ian O. L. et al (2008) *Sources of Conflict in the Greater Middle-East.* New York: Routledge.

Kayhan Bargezar(2009) Iran, the Middle-East and Global Security. Osaka: Koshenikov.

Morgenthau, HJ. (1978), Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,

Fourth Edition, Revised, New York: Alfred Knopf. Obikeze, D.S. (1990) *Methods of Data Analysis in Social and Behavioural Sciences*.

Enugu:Auto-Century Publishing Company Ltd.

GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL DOCUMENT

Prados, B.A. (2001) "Middle East: Attitudes Toward the United States".CRS Report for Congress.

NEWSPAPERS

Kifiier, J. (2001) "The New Power of Arab Public Opinion," *New York Times*, November 11,2001.

"Saudis Balk at U.S. Use of Key Facility," *The Washington Post,* September 22,2001.

Waxman, S. (2001) "Arab TV's Strong Signal," *The Washington Post*, December 4, 2001.

PAPER

Kochler, H. (2008) "Global Security in the Absence of a Balance of Power: The Importance of Inter-regional Co-operation". Statement delivered at the international conference on *"Countries of the Caucasus and the Middle East -Possible?artners in the Process of the Formation of a Regional Security System "* Yerevan, Armenia, 7-8 February 2008.

JOURNAL ARTICLE

Holger, J., (2001) "Here's Why They Hate Us," *The (Fairfax) Sunday Journal, October 28, 2001*.